ABSTRACT

Over the past 150 years New Zealand has on
occasions proved to be one of the most socially innovative countries in the
‘developed’ world.  It was New Zealand’s
distinctive approach to social policy in the Liberal period which lead to its
designation as a ‘Social Laboratory’ and this reputation and designation has
been reiterated on at least three subsequent occasions.

This presentation will examine the social
laboratory within the context of a radically changing environment and a
significant social deficit.  In order to
address this deficit, social policy reforms will need to confront the country’s
population profile (especially its social and cultural diversity), the changing
patterns of families and households and the way in these systems intersect with
economic and social policy.

New Zealand's reputation as one of the most
socially innovative countries in the 'developed' world first emerged in the
latter years of the nineteenth century. It became a self-governing democracy in
1856 and in 1893 it was the first country in the world to grant universal
suffrage to women. When commentators refer to New Zealand's social welfare
history they usually identify the Old Age Pensions Act of 1898 as the most
innovative legislation of that time.

Yet in retrospect there is little doubt that
it was the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 which captured
the attention of the global community and first led to this country's
designation as a Social Laboratory. The IC & A Act provided a system for
the settlement of industrial disputes, encouraged the formation of Trade Unions
and guaranteed a basic minimum wage.

New Zealand writers describing the thinking
behind the legislation wrote of a theory of fair wages sufficent to give the
worker a decent living according to the colonial standard. Since the average
'worker' of the time was male and since 'normal needs' encompassed domestic
responsibilities, the fair wage was soon defined as being a 'family wage'
sufficent to support a wife and two or three children in a reasonable standard
of comfort. In this way the social policy provisions of the time were directly
integrated with the wage fixing procedures of the state. The family wage not
only established a basic minimum income for the majority of households, but it
protected wage rates and conditions and it included provisions for sickness
leave and overtime.(Shirley et al, 1997)

THE
SOCIAL WAGE

The second phase in the development of the
social laboratory occurred in the wake of the great depression. The Family or
Social Wage not only underpinned the provisions of the 1938 Social Security
Act, but the wage itself was extended to encompass the provision of free
primary and secondary education, a community-based preventative health scheme,
a salaried medical service, a free public hospital system and a state housing
programme for those who could not afford a home of their own.

If the regulation of wages was a corner stone
of New Zealand's welfare state arrangements, then a second fundamental element
was full employment. In contrast to the European and Scandinavian countries who
based their welfare states on extensive systems of income maintenance and
social insurance, the organising principles of the New Zealand approach to
social policy centred on the industrial court, the provision of a social or
family wage and the  participation of
male workers in the labour market. Those outside the waged majority were
protected by a means-tested and selective system of social benefits. Bill
Oliver describes our attitude to those on benefits at the time as one of
'benevolence, discipline and the deserving poor'.

The combination of a family wage and full
employment distinguished and dominated the development of the New Zealand
welfare state for almost fifty years. Home ownership was particularly
significant, both as a stabilising influence and as a central element in a
family's economic and social security. Within the context of the family wage it
attached a 'man' firmly to a job, a piece of land and to a social group – it
established a base for 'his' family and so to a network of neighbourhood
institutions such as church, school and voluntary society. In national terms,
the high wage rates which were achieved because of the relative affluence of
the country, led to high levels of private home ownership, with mortgage
repayments serving in effect as a major form of retirement security.

WELFARE
STATE ACHIEVEMENTS

By any standards the level of welfare achieved
in the immediate post-war period was exceedingly high, with the inceasing
affluence of the population reflected in New Zealand's consistent rating among
the top five of the world's wealthiest nations. The country was socially and
politically stable and for over thirty years maintained a remarkable record of
full employment. New Zealand's trading fortunes were based essentially on
domestically produced primary products for the British market. It was a trading
relationship that provided a guaranteed market for a narrow range of staple
products such as meat, wool and dairy produce.

The economic policies of the post-war period
concentrated on insulating New Zealand by means of protective tariffs, the
imposition of import licences and the provision of subsidies for farming and
manufacturing. The stable environment was reflected in the labour market which
was characterised by occupational mobility and which in turn contributed to the
public perception of a classless society.

I grew up in a generation in which my father
had a paid job and my mother provided unpaid work in the home as well as voluntary
work in the community. The family wage paid to my father was supplemented by
the government in the form of free education and health services for all
members of the family. When I left school the most difficult task I faced was
deciding on a job or career because the country had full employment.

The state provided in effect a 'social
contract' between the generations which was fulfilled by my parents when I and
my brothers were growing up and which was reciprocated when my parents later
lived with members of the family. It was a family and an environment that
placed a high premium on values such as justice, integrity and social
responsibility.

The third party to the contract (the
government) played a very significant rôle in supplementing the family wage and
in reinforcing economic and social security. It was a contract that delicately
balanced affection and duty, trust and security, love and reciprocity.  Individuals had the freedom to develop in
their own unique way, but this individual effort was tempered by respect for
others. We learnt that cooperation was essential for the economic and social
well-being of all.

ECONOMIC
VULNERABILITY AND DECLINE

The environment that produced this distinctive
approach to economic and social security gradually changed through the 1960's
and 70's highlighting New Zealand's economic vulnerability. As Britain forged
closer links with the European community, New Zealand's long-standing role as
the British farm in the Pacific was undergoing a major transformation. Despite
policies aimed at diversifying New Zealand's export base, the value of foreign
trade declined.

The
increasing gap between export receipts and import prices was influenced by
external factors such as the oil crisis (1973) and the actions of overseas
governments who sought to protect their productive sectors. At the same time
overseas markets set new requirements for primary industries such as dairying
and meat, which imposed additional costs on the processing of these
commodities. Synthetic substitutes for wool and butter and alternative red meat
products directly affected New Zealand trade.

In response to this changing international
environment, the economy was slowly opened up to overseas competition by the
dismantling of some import controls and by means of incentives which were
designed to strengthen the export potential of both the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors. This was a market driven restructuring programme
supported by government policies in taxation, investment, research and development.

Industry was reorganised through mergers,
takeovers and amalgamations thus increasing the size of plants and in some
instances changing the basis of ownership from individuals to one of
interlocking company ownership and control. Despite these amalgamations our
productive units remained small – an important fact whenever we consider
development options in New Zealand.

The viability of the Family Wage also declined
at this time alongside a major transformation in demographic patterns.
Households responded to the decline in the value of the family wage by
expanding household income through multiple jobs and part-time employment.
Women entered the paid work-force in increasing numbers thereby accepting a
'double load' encompassing both paid work and domestic labour.

POLICY
RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND DECLINE

Policy responses to economic vulnerability
were first focussed on 'indicative planning' based on setting national targets
for production, export, labour and capital. As the global crisis deepened in
the 1970's, government embarked on a programme of substituting domestic  energy-related commodities. The capital
intensive development programme (Think Big) was based around industries such as
petro-chemical production, electricity generation, aluminium smelting, the
manufacturing of steel and the processing of forestry products. Think Big was a
major factor in New Zealand's  growing
external deficit.

Social policy at this time was characterised
by incrementalism. There was a continuing commitment to full employment, (at
least in the rhetoric of government) and a belated attempt to address the
falling value of the family wage through a freeze on prices and wages. Equal
pay legislation was introduced thereby acknowledging the changing parameters of
the labour market and at the same time families were able to capitalise the
family benefit an initiative that was aimed at facilitating home ownership. The
introduction of Accident Compensation was perhaps the most innovative welfare
reform  at this time - it was lauded as a
landmark in the development of the welfare state and reinforced New Zealand's
reputation as a social laboratory.

THE
MACRO-ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT OF THE 1980’S AND 1990’S

As the country's indebtedness increased under
'Think Big', macro economic policy in the mid 1980's swung dramatically to the
right. An international study of the Anglophone countries   refers to Thatcherism, Reganomics and
Rogernomics as misleading abbreviations for an antiquated version of
laissez-faire economics which varied from one context to another but followed
nevertheless, a clearly established pattern.

Jobs were cut – incomes were reduced – state
services were withdrawn – and the increasing costs of health, education,
housing and community care were transfered to families in general and to women
in particular. The most graphic example from the international study was New
Zealand which chose to venture far beyond any other jurisdiction by adopting an
extreme  version of economic
rationalisation in pursuit of a highly speculative development path.

Although the reforms were lauded by a range of
Think Tanks and commentators including the Economist which described New
Zealand as ‘a free market economists paradise with the least distorting tax
system of any OECD country, the most liberalised financial markets and the most
independent central bank’, we know (as the guinia pigs in this experiment) how
it impacted on jobs, incomes and services by changing the parameters of social
policy and the welfare state.

THE
CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC RATIONALISATION

The cumulative impact of these policies
resulted in severe damage to the tradeable sector. Profits, employment and
investment were all affected and at the same time export growth sharply
diminished.

Investment in New Zealand manufacturing
declined by almost 50% between 1985 and 1989. Major employment areas such as
forestry and manufacturing declined by 67% and 21% respectively. The workforce
of forestry towns such as Murapara became redundant overnight.

Within 18 months of implementing the programme
of economic rationalisation unemployment trebled and by 1991 registered
unemployment represented 11% of the total workforce. Long-term unemployment
became a serious social problem and because of the segmented nature of both
employment and unemployment, the social problem had racial overtones

An estimated 20% of the Maori working age
population lost their jobs in the two years from March 1987 to March 1989. Two
years later the unemployment rate for non-Maori aged 15 – 24 years was nearly
20% - for Maori it was approaching 40%.

Exclusion from the paid workforce placed
increasing pressure on immediate and extended families and where families were
unable to support their dependents, the state became the primary means of
income support. As a consequence, government became exposed to relatively high
levels of welfare expenditure. In 1981 (apart from national superanuation and
the family benefit) almost 115,000 people were in receipt of a welfare benefit
– by 1985 that figure more than doubled and by 1992 it had trebled. By 1993,
just over one quater of all dependent children were in households supported by
benefits.

Bruce Jesson's assessment of the economic
outcomes (with minor qualifications) stands today as one of the most articulate
summaries of economic rationalisation in New Zealand. I quote :

A generation ago
our economy was controlled by producers – since the mid 1980's it has been
dominated by money lenders and dealers. Buying and selling companies became
more important than selling products. Economic theologians freed markets where
they were controlled by government and they constructed markets where they did
not exist, as in the case of electricity. In other areas such as health they
simulated markets where markets could not be constructed. Instead of selling
products we sold companies and debt and with these assets we sold the income
that went with them (Jesson, 1999).

 

THE
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORK, FAMILY and the STATE

The relations between work, the family and the
state which had prevailed throughout most of the post-war period were radically
changed. These changes started well before the advent of economic
rationalisation as women became increasingly involved in the formal economy and
men (with somewhat less enthusiasm) were drawn into the domestic sphere of the
household.

The ideology underpinning these reforms was
articulated in Briefing Papers prepared by the Treasury in 1984 and 1987. In
these papers, society was portrayed as a collection of individuals without any
social or cultural identity. Paraphrasing Margaret Thatcher's penetrating
intellectual discovery that there is no such thing as society Treasury
concluded:

‘Families and
tribes are not organic entities with mortality, rationality and senses, they cannot feel
pleasure and pain - - the individual person is the logical basis for (social
policy) analysis’

Human groups, institutions and collectivities
of one sort or another were reduced to a world of rational individual beings
seeking to maximise their productive capacities. Even concepts such as justice
and fairness were prescribed by individual rights and responsibilities with
major social policy domains such as health and education reduced to a range of
commodities which could be purchased by individuals for their own enhancement
and well-being.

In
Treasury's terminology, the purpose or function of education was  ‘to
prepare the individual for his or her economic role’ : Education we were
told was ‘a private commodity not a public good’ (The Treasury, 1987)

The reform programme attacked the assumptions,
as well as the mechanisms on which the post-war consensus had been built.
Social factors were artifically separated from economic policy, and as a
consequence social policy was reduced to a form of Social Plumbing – a placebo
that might treat the worst side effects of the economic realm.

With the election of a new government in 1990
these measures were taken to their illogical conclusion. As state expenditure
on social security and social welfare increased, so government sought to target
its expenditure by narrowing the criteria for benefit eligibility and by
reducing state funded services across a range of traditional social policy
domains such as education, health and housing. What began with the assertion
from a Labour Government Minister that the cause of much unemployment was
fundamentally good news, was taken further by the National government through
the imposition of benefit cuts and the introduction of market rentals for state
housing. It was a combination of policy reforms that cost us dearly as a
nation.

The assumptions on which the 1991 benefit cuts
were introduced were fundamentally flawed. The formal research by Treasury
aimed at determining income adequacy was based on three elements. First, the
concept of a ‘core family’ which has since been abandoned because it failed to
make any demographic sense – secondly, a minimum income level for a family
‘based on the average cost of feeding a prisoner’ – you can draw your own
conclusions to that association. And thirdly,an assumed link between the
receipt of welfare benefits and a disincentive to work,  which is now seriously questioned on the
basis of empirical studies.

Yet despite these glaring deficiencies the
benefit cuts were imposed and not only did they produce increasing levels of
destitution and hardship, but they also put a series of measures in place which
were internationally regarded as the most punitive set of policies of any OECD
country designed to make the claiming of benefits less attractive (Gough,
1995).

In the early 1990's Brian Easton and I
attempted to measure the economic and social costs of unemployment beginning
with personal costs to individuals, families and communities and going on to
estimate the costs incurred by society at large. Using Brian Philpotts
productivity forecasting model we concluded that 105,000 people registered as
unemployed, could be equated with 12.8 billion dollars in lost production to
the New Zealand economy. The number of people unemployed at that time was over
300,000.

THE
SOCIAL DEFICIT

It is not difficult to understand why we have
incurred such a substantial social deficit

today. At its core lies the increasing
polarisation of households – the significant increase in inequality and poverty
irrespective of the measures being used - labour market segmentation that has
produced 'work rich and work poor' households – long-term unemployment in
working class neighbourhoods (especially among young people) and among Maori,
Pasifika and new migrant populations – a resurgence of preventable childhood
diseases associated with factors such as material deprivation and over-crowding
– and geographic areas that have become 
sharply differentiated ( especially in Auckland) leading to
neighbourhoods of choice and fate.

This deficit will clearly condition our policy
options over the next decade.

FAMILIES
AND HOUSEHOLDS

The major shifts in the policy environment
that I have briefly outlined today were also evident in the stucture of
households but these changes in the form and profile of  New Zealand families began well before the
policy reforms of the 1980’s and 90’s. The changes in families and households
included :

• major shifts in household type
  with non-parenting couples becoming more significant
• an overall increase in sole-parent
  families and a concomitant decrease in two-parent households
• a significant rise in the number
  of children born ex-nuptually especially to couples in mid-childbearing ages
• a decline in the rate of formally
  registered marriages yet when combined with cohabitation, the number of
  partnerships has remained relatively stable
• a trend toward later marriages and
  later childbearing, and
• an overall decline in average
  family size

 

FAMILY
WELFARE AND MORAL VALUES

Along with these changes in the demographic
profile of families and households, an increasing emphasis on moral values and
judgements was  injected into the policy
debates. Such judgements are not new and they are not confined to New Zealand.
In countries such as Finland and France for example, the national constitution
provides a supportive framework for family law, whereas in Germany and
Luxembourg it focusses attention on the legitimate family as sanctioned by
marriage.

In some countries new family forms such as
lone-parent families, co-habiting couples and reconstituted households are
readily accepted, but in others, these family types are treated as deviations
from the norm and as social problems requiring government action. While
countries such as Portugal place emphasis on the traditional family and
traditional family values (a position strongly reinforced by the Catholic
church and the state) in Italy the focus centres on non-traditional family
forms and reconciling the conflicting objectives of protecting the privacy of
the family unit whilst at the same time supporting women in the paid workforce
with generous provisions for maternity leave.

If values are going to be significant in
reforming family policy then perhaps the government (and the Working Group)
need to make these assumptions transparent and it is here that the research
evidence becomes particularly significant. For example, there is no clear
evidence that being legally married makes better parents – the diversity of
households is merely one factor influencing childhood outcomes. Likewise,
before we asign value judgements to single parent families it is worth quoting
the one international study produced in New Zealand which concludes that lone
parenthood is generally a stage in family life rather than a permanent status –
in other words if we want to capture the dynamics of family structure in policy
terms, then we need to see lone-parent families as households in transition.
This does not mean ignoring lone-parent families when it comes to policy and
research priorities.  What it does mean
is shifting the focus from family structure in general (and lone parenthood in
particular) to centering attention on the economic and social wellbeing of
children.

THE
LABOUR MARKET AND MORAL VALUES

Value judgements also permeate labour market
policy and especially labour market reforms. As structural unemployment
increased in countries such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand during the
1970's and 1980's, it was treated as an adjustment problem en route to a more
efficient economy -  efficiency was
equated with low inflationary trends, minimal government and a 'natural' rate
of unemployment.

Workfare programmes in response to
unemployment in the USA (1980's) embodied two alternative explanations.  The first assumed that the unemployed did not
work because they lacked sufficient motivation, whereas the second maintained
that they were inadequately prepared for work. The logic of the first commanded
coercian and punitive sanctions – the second prescribed a range of compensatory
and support services aimed at enhancing job readiness.

These prescriptions conveniently ignored
policy failures as well as the broader institutional environment that produced
destructively high rates of unemployment. Underlying these prescriptions is a
pathological view of unemployment which assigns culpability to those out of
work on the basis of inadequacy, failure and even deviancy.

In contrast to these  moral interpretations of welfare and work,
international studies such as  Esping-Anderson's typology of welfare states,
places emphasis on the way in which different countries provide income adequacy
through labour market participation and social transfers. Aside from the
inherent limitations in his initial typology, he does provide a basis for
understanding the social democratic model, as represented by the Scandinavian
countries. In these countries we find an emphasis on the universal rights of
citizenship (and welfare) whilst at the same time maximising the productive
capacities of the population through education, training and active labour
market policies.

The contribution of this approach lies in the
way in which it allows us to set aside value laden terms associated with
welfare, the family, unemployment and beneficaries – in this latter respect it
is worth recalling that at various stages of our history, farmers,
manufacturers, employers and workers have all been 'beneficaries' – I won't
comment on politicians or academics who were among the major ‘beneficiaries’ of
recent changes to the tax system.

NEW
ZEALAND POPULATION PROFILE

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of social
policy and welfare reform over the past three decades (aside from the policy
framework itself) concerns the changing profile of the New Zealand population.
Economic and social policy has not come to terms with these changes because it
continues to use frameworks that seem incapable of understanding different
cultural, social and economic groups. I referred earlier to the concept of the
core family – it made little sense in 1991 – it makes even less sense today if
we look at characteristics such as age, family size, location and a wide range
of cultural factors which are increasingly significant in the delivery of
health, education, housing and social services.

These aspects of social policy are
particularly acute in Auckland where immigration policies have had a profound
influence on the changing composition of the population.

In order to emphasise the significance of
population in terms of welfare reform let me focus briefly on two population
groups – namely, Pasifika populations and children.

PASIFIKA
PEOPLE

Pasifika people came to this country with high
expectations both for themselves and for their children. They played a
significant role in the economy during the 1960’s and 1970’s and they continue
to make a contribution to many aspects of New Zealand life today : from
sport to fashion, from the creative industries to engagement in the NZ Tourism
and service sectors ; from education to health and the social services.
But whenever population comparisons are made, Pasifika populations stand out
because of their age profiles, their relatively low incomes and their financial
commitments.

Pasifika populations comprise a greater
proportion of the younger age groups in New Zealand, with nearly half of
Pasifika people being under 20 years of age. In Auckland, nearly one quarter of
children under 10 are in Pasifika households and 40% of those are in Manukau.

Pasifika people have significantly lower
average incomes than the rest of the New Zealand population. In Auckland, the
average Pasifika weekly wage was between 62% and 78% of the average weekly wage
in Auckland for the period (1998-2008) and since 2008 there has been little
change.

Not only do Pasifika people have lower
incomes, they also have greater financial commitments to their families in New
Zealand because of the age profile of Pacific households and in making remittances
to their extended families in the Islands. Compared with other population
groups Pacific families have few assets and as a consequence they stand out as
a population group with virtually no asset base and resources.

If we are serious about the economic and
social wellbeing  of Pacific people, then
tinkering with benefits or tax transfers in the wake of the increasing costs of
living will do little to alter the life opportunities and potential of Pacific
households.

 

CHILDREN

The second population group that stands out as
being seriously disadvantaged is children.

Within the industrialised world children have
replaced the elderly as the poor generation. Yet whenever children are viewed
as a population group they are generally perceived as a collection of
individuals – the dependent cogs of the family unit within a society of adults.
Even the statistics we collect on children are almost exclusively focussed on
‘the family’ or ‘the household’ and as a consequence the child is viewed as a
by-product of the main unit of observation.

This reductionist approach to childhood is
exemplified in studies of children at risk where the focus centres on
individual deficiencies and pathologies, thereby excluding factors such as
housing, work-poor households, the economic circumstances of the family or the
pervasive influence of unfavourable neighbourhoods.

Until the late 19th century, the protection of
children was confined to legal sanctions against murder, maiming and incest.
When the protection against adult cruelty and neglect followed, it was modelled
on legislation aimed at preventing cruelty to animals.

Not only did the rights of children come last
in the family hierarchy, but early protective legislation defined children as
suborinate members of society who owed obedience and deference to the father of
the family, to the master of the school and to other institutions in loco parentis. Whereas the emancipation
of adult males was a liberation from gerontocracy, feudalism, slavery and other
socio-economic tyrants, the emancipation of women and children has been a
process of liberation from patriarchy, with childrens’ rights only emerging 50
years after the first significant advances for women.

It is an established fact that when it comes
to population groups in New Zealand, children have been disproportionately
disadvantaged. Whether we take household income or poverty, or components of
deprivation such as the quality of housing, access to education and health
services, or the viability of neighbourhoods, the biggest losers have been
children.

Noam Chomsky (1996) quotes an American
Commission on the subject :

Never before has
one generation of children been less healthy, less cared for or
less prepared for life. That is our legacy to the current
generation 

It is an assessment which is reinforced by
empirical evidence in New Zealand.

CONCLUSION

What becomes patently clear whether we focus on Pasifika populations or
children, or youth,  the aging population
or disabled persons, is that our social policy provisions are no longer
sustainable. They are not sustainable according to those leading the current
welfare reform process because of the fiscal costs of welfare. It is an
argument that needs to be seriously questioned. 

From what I have outlined today it becomes
apparent that the issue of sustainability goes well beyond the need to reduce
welfare expenditure. As the recent OECD Forum noted,the current economic crisis
being played out in North America, Europe and other industrialised nations,
stems from the uncoupling of law and markets and from what commentators have
referred to as the failure of the private marketplace. That assessment has
particular relevance in New Zealand where private indebtedness has emerged as a
major problem for the national economy. By far the greatest proportion of New
Zealand’s fiscal deficit today (which is equivalent to 90% of annual GDP) can
be attributed to the private sector and the private market place. The evidence
is contained in the 2010 budget.

New Zealand once led the world because of its
distinctive social policy arrangements only to lose its way in the 1980’s and
90’s with policy initiatives that undermined individual and collective
security.

The family wage has been replaced by an
incoherent set of policies which neither recognise the demographic patterns of
households or population groups.

As a consequence we have incurred a
substantial social deficit which will condition our policy options for years,
perhaps decades to come.

If social policy concerns the way in which
society meets its collective responsibilities by enhancing human development
and advancing social wellbeing, then the time has clearly arrived when we need
to reassert the pragmatism and innovation that characterised this country’s
reputation as a social laboratory. The current model, which is essentially an
imported model, has failed our most vulnerable populations.

Not only is it driven by an imported ideology,
but it has undermined that integrated approach to economic and social
development which was the strength of New Zealand’s social laboratory. Today,
economic policies are associated with production, whereas social
policies are confined to issues of distribution. We will not make any
significant progress in my view until we recognise that it is the social and
cultural components of development that need to preface the technical options
open to economics. This means in effect, reversing our current preoccupation
with the number of beneficaries, the structure of families and households and
the moral judgements assigned to welfare beneficaries in general and
lone-parent households in particular.

Welfare is determined by the character and
quality of living conditions – by the way in which human beings are able to
participate in society and gain some control over their everyday lives. This
assumes as it once did under our distinctive approach to social policy that a
priority is placed on the social and political determinants of wellbeing such
as work, fellowship and social solidarity.

Ultimately it means differentiating between
private interests and the public interest or the common good. It requires that
man and womankind stand at the centre of development – not as consumers,
commodities or units of production – but as social and political beings with a
history, a culture and a dignity of their own.

 

References :

Chomsky,Noam (1996) Power and Prospects :Reflections on Human Nature and the Social
Order, New South Wales, Allen and Unwin.

Jesson, Bruce (1999) Only Their Purpose is Mad, Dunmore Press, Palmerston North.

Pool, Ian, Arunachalam Dharmalingam, Janet
Sceats (2007) The New Zealand Family from
1840 : A Demographic History,  Auckland University Press, Auckland.

Pool, Ian (1992) The New Zealand Family Structural
Changes in the context of shifts in Societal Values in New Zealand Population Review, 18 (1 and 2) 69 – 86.

Shirley, Ian, Peggy Koopman-Boyden, Ian Pool,
Susan St John (1997) Family Change and Family Policies : New Zealand, in
Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn (editors) Family
Change and Family Policies in Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Shirley, Ian (1993) Experiments in the New
Zealand Laboratory.  A paper presented at
the Conference on Comparative Research on the Welfare State in Transition,
Oxford University, September.

St John, Susan and A. Heynes (1993) The
Welfare Mess, Department of Economics, University of Auckland.

Treasury, The (1987) Government
Management.  Post-Elections Briefing to
the Incoming Government, Wellington : 
New Zealand Treasury.

Treasury, The (1984) Economic Management.  Post-Election Briefing to the Incoming Government,
Wellington :  New Zealand
Treasury.